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EDITOR'S NOTE
In the following article, Professor Deutsch considers the pro-
cesses by which the common law of corporations has devel-
oped Both personal and institutionalfactors are discussed in an
rt7toaccountfor the development of the concept of corporate
duciary duty. It is left for the reader to resolve the intricate
ambiguities raised by Professor Deutsch's hypothetical charac-
ters.
M: I'm beginning to think it was a mistake to take law courses in night
school. Now that I've finished introductory corporate law, I under-
stand less than ever how you lawyers can respond so smugly to the cur-
rent news of corporate bribery, criticizing what you call excesses on the
part of administrative agencies, and simply taking for granted that the
judical system-the common law-will produce better results.
S: The one thing you cannot accuse me of is smugness. I do what you pay
me to do, which is to manipulate the mysteries of law, but the one thing
that process does not permit is smugness. Since the mysteries of the
common law are judicial opinions, those opinions are relevant only in-
sofar as they are treated as precedents in future judicial decisions, and
such future decisions can only occur if two lawyers believe that diver-
gent results are sufficiently likely on the basis of the existing precedents
to justify taking fees from the clients who want those divergent results.
As to the recent reports concerning corporate bribery, several
things, it seems to me, must be taken into account. Almost all the cor-
porate executives involved argue both that it was being done to maxi-
mize profits and that it had to be done because their competitors were
engaging in such practices. Both of those statements are, of course, fac-
tual assertions which in any given situation may or may not be true, but
I think you will agree it is objectively true that the standards in terms of
which corporate behavior is judged have risen, and that the question
that is now being answered is whether given corporations were too lag-
gard in acknowledging that higher standard. If you agree with this
analysis, what we are facing is a classic instance of the application of the
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general legal standard known as the fiduciary principle, and Meinhard v.
Salmon' is, of course, regularly cited as the precedent embodying that
principle.
M: That's exactly the case that started me wondering about you lawyers,
since it is indeed constantly being cited to justify the application of the
fiduciary principle to corporate behavior, while the decision itself was
not only concerned with real estate, but-more to the point-involved
the question of what behavior was required by the law from a partner,
not a corporate executive. 2
S: I don't see what's puzzling about that. Business is increasingly utilizing
the corporate structure, and the principle of Meinhard is therefore being
applied to that situation.
M: But the one thing I kept learning in my corporate law course was the
significance of formal requirements, and I simply do not understand
why the differences between partnership and corporate structures are so
totally ignored in the application of fiduciary principle.
S: Since your study of law surely also taught you that formal requirements
may or may not be determinative of the result in any given legal dispute,
I in turn am puzzled by your insistence upon the application of such
requirements.
M: In the end, I suppose my preference is rooted in the fact that prediction
is the basis on which we attempt rationally to control the future, and
that accurate prediction is the result of sound theory.
S: But why is that related to formality?
M: Because sound theory requires clear and precise definition of terms, and
that process ultimately results in formal distinctions or classifications.
S: I accept the human need for theoretical structures as a way of feeling in
control of future events, but if the point is to gain accurate knowledge
about such events, it seems yet more important to recognize that, insofar
as those future events are intimately involved with human behavior,
theoretical structures are as likely to mislead as to be successful in fore-
warning us what to expect.
Indeed, if you are willing to treat economics as a theoretical struc-
ture, I would say that the success of Meinhard v. Salmon-its reiterated
citation in situations different from that involved in the case before the
court-is due precisely to its recognition of this insight. Don't forget
that the passage of the opinion most frequently cited specifically argues
that:
1. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
2. A managing coadventurer appropriating the benefit of such a lease without warning to his
partner might fairly expect to be reproached with conduct that was underhand, or lacking, to
say the least, in reasonable candor, if the partner were to surprise him in the act of si.ing the
new instrument. Conduct subject to that reproach does not receive from equity a healing bene-
diction. d. at 468. 164 N.E. at 548.
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Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another,
while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.3
M: As I now understand your argument, it is that law is more successful
than the marketplace in controlling human behavior.
S: I'm not certain I could argue that the law is more successful in each and
every case; what I claim is that the marketplace is necessarily inade-
quate, and that the law is therefore necessarily required, not because it is
a better theory, but precisely because the case-by-case development of
the common law reminds us that there are limitations to the applicabil-
ity of any given rule.
M: I, of course, understand that the rules in given precedents may conflict;
but how does that relate to the fact that the concepts in terms of which
those rules are developed may ultimately be definable in formal terms?
S: The point is that as soon as such concepts become sufficiently precise to
be defined in such terms, they become inadequate descriptions of
human behavior.
Perhaps I can illustrate my point more concretely by demonstrating
that any attempt to formulate a theory concerning power inevitably
ends either by denying the existence of influence or minimizing its
significance. For this purpose, I define power as something demon-
strated by the ability to control external events in accordance with one's
desires and influence as control over other actors.
M: I agree that power is a concept that would be relevant to our discussion
if all we were discussing was control over future events. But since what
we are discussing is the law governing corporate behavior, I fail to see
why the definitions of power and influence are matters we should con-
sider.
S: I assume you agree that Perlman v. Feldman4 is an important case in
corporate law, and that it can fairly be described as attempting to de-
velop a theory concerning the power of corporate control. If so, I
would argue that Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates 5-in which the three
opinions on the question of the percentage of stock ownership necessary
to bring into play the fiduciary standards delineated in Perlman agreed
only that a full trial should be had-demonstrates the necessary impre-
cision of the concept of power in corporate law.
3. Id. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546.
4. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
5. 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
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M: Since no trial was held, I'm not sure I agree that the lack of precision is
unavoidable, but even if I accepted the fact that power was an imprecise
concept, I fail to see what influence has to do with our discussion.
S: Influence is the power a leader exercises over his followers. In the
broadest theoretical terms, I suppose it works because of the peculiarly
human trait of self-consciousness, which I call peculiarly human be-
cause I assume humans are the only animals who spend time thinking
about themselves from an outside point of view. By this I mean from a
point of view that could be designated as neutral, value-free, and objec-
tive. It is because of this self-consciousness that the psychological proc-
ess called identification can take place, in that a human can behave as
though some other human knew better than himself what was good for
him. Such behavior, of course, is what we observe when we say that
someone is under the influence of a leader.
M: If we define the value of law as providing the opportunities for "sober
second thoughts," and the value of economics as a theory whose terms
are capable of sufficiently precise definition to permit calculations of
rationality that are independent of purely personal preferences, then I
think I can say that the behavior you are describing should be called
political rather than legal or economic, and that it is properly desig-
nated either hasty or irrational.
S: I think the case that demonstrates that your distinction between political
and economic behavior is untenable is Berwald v. Mission Development
Co.,6 in which the Supreme Court of Delaware refused to liquidate a
holding company and distribute its assets. The sole significant asset of
the holding company was a block of stock in an operating company in
which there was an announced policy of declaring neither cash nor
stock dividends. Since, when this policy was announced, shareholders
in the holding company were offered an opportunity to exchange their
shares for shares in the operating company, I suggest that, in your terms,
it was irrational for them not to do so. The legal argument plaintiffs
were making in Mission Development was that "There is an inherent
conflict of interest between the controlling stockholder of Mission, Mr.
J. Paul Getty, and the minority stockholders."' 7 What I am arguing is
that the behavior of the minority stockholders can equally well be de-
scribed as that of persons acting under the influence of J. Paul Getty.
M: I will agree that my attempt clearly to separate political from economic
behavior in terms of the law fails to account for Berwald. Since the
decision about which we disagree is Meinhard v. Salmon, however, I
remain unconvinced that law cannot fairly be judged by the rigorous
standards inherent in formal theoretical concepts. Salmon itself, after
all, was phrased in terms of the legal duties imposed on the formal sta-
6. 40 Del. Ch. 509, 185 A.2d 480 (1962).
7. Id. at 512, 185 A.2d at 482.
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tus of co-venturer rather than a description of the consequences derived
from a finding that Salmon exercised influence over Meinhard.
S: I'm afraid your formal reading of the Meinhard v. Salmon precedent,
lawyer-like as it is, omits certain facts. Thus, in January 1917, Mein-
hard transferred to his wife his interest in the agreement made between
himself and Salmon, and although she transferred it back on June 22,
1922 (after all the acts complained of in the lawsuit had occurred), on
July 21, 1919,8 Meinhard requested Salmon to make all checks payable
to Carrie W. Meinhard, enclosing a letter from himself to the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, in which he said, "You have doubtless mis-
taken me as having received moneys as agent or landlord, but I have
simply acted as agent and attorney for Carrie W. Meinhard, who has a
half interest in the net earnings of the Bristol Building, 500 5th Ave-
nue."9
M: That may well be, but the New York Court of Appeals held for Morton
H. Meinhard, and what you are citing in an attempt to demonstrate that
Meinhard had given up his interest in the transaction was not found by
the referee on the ground that the "evidence [was] not ultimate fact."' 0
S: I don't disagree with what you say. It just seems to me either that the
precedent disregards the formal fact of a transfer of interest or that you
are agreeing that the mechanisms of the legal process-which produced
the referee's cryptic evidentiary finding-were more effective in this in-
stance than non-legal theoretical analysis. Theoretical analysis, after
all, if it were identifying the actor in economic partnership with Salmon,
would have to designate Carrie rather than Morton, since the Cardozo
opinion itself notes that Meinhard's participation in the transaction was
restricted to the giving of "money, but neither time nor labor. . ... I
M: I accept your argument that formal analysis alone cannot account for
the power of Salmon v. Meinhard as a precedent. Nevertheless, I refuse
to accept the proposition that the rhetoric which justified the application
of the fiduciary principle, in disregard of the formal fact of a transfer of
interest, is to be considered a legal principle simply because it is so regu-
larly cited. Given the age of the Salmon precedent, however, I think
our disagreement about the need for precision might be clarified by fo-
cussing on more recent decisions.
My point about what I regard as needless imprecision is perhaps
best made by the recent Delaware decision in Tanzer v. International
General Industries, Inc.' 2 Justices Duffy begins that opinion by noting
that:
8. Referee's Report, Record, at 102-04.
9. Defendant's Exhibits 12 and 12a, Record, at 1747-48.
10. Eighteenth Proposed Finding of Fact on Behalf of Defendant, Record, at 152.
11. 249 N.Y. 458, 468, 164 N.E. 546, 548 (1928).
12. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
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In Singer v. Magnavox Company. . ., 380 A. 2d 969
(1977), we held that a merger of a Delaware corporation
caused by a majority stockholder solely for the purpose of
cashing-out minority stockholders is, a violation of a fiduciary
duty owed by the former to the latter. We reserved for an-
other day the question of whether a merger made primarily to
advance the business purpose of the majority stockholder is a
violation of that duty. 13
He concludes that:
Since IGI's purpose in causing the Kliklok merger was a
proper exercise of its voting power under the rule announced
herein, we affirm the order of the Trial Court denying plain-
tifis motion for a preliminary injunction. 14
This ruling, however, does not terminate the litigation be-
cause, given the fiduciary duty owed in any event by IGI to
the minority stockholders of Kiiklok, the latter are entitled to
a fairness hearing under Singer. The Chancellor's opinion,
announced at the preliminary injunction stage of this proceed-
ing, discussed fairness only in terms of the price offered for the
stock, but that was too restrictive. The test required by
Singer, which applied the rule of Sterling, involves judicial
scrutiny for "entire fairness" as to all aspects of the transac-
tion. ' 5
I think my objections to Tanzer are best put by noting that Justice
McNeilly concurred in Singer because, although he "agree[d] with
the holding of the majority that a § 251 merger, made for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the
corporate process [and] also agree[d] with the learned and eloquent
analysis of the Delaware case law on the subject of mergers made
by Justice Duffy in his opinion, [he was] inclined to think. . . that
the [Duffy] opinion waffles in its attempt to establish guidelines for
future merger litigation with emphasis on the coined phrase 'busi-
ness purpose', which standing alone connotes nothing magic or de-
finitive."' 6
The extent to which the majority regarded McNeilly's criti-
cism as telling is indicated by the fact that the Singer opinion, al-
though handed down before Tanzer, in fact appears in a later
volume of the Reporter. Even in terms of the Tanzer opinion it-
self, moreover, which held that "[tihe test required by
Singer. . .applied the rule of Sterling"'7 it seems significant that,
in Singer, it was Justice McNeilly in concurrence and not the ma-
jority, who held that "In these cases of going private, be they merg-
ers under § 251 or § 253, it is my opinion that Sterling v.
Mayflower, 93 A.2d 107 (1952), establishes an avenue for judicial
13. Id. at 1122.
14. Id. at 1125.
15. Id.
16. 380 A.2d 969, 982 (Del. 1977).
17. 379 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Del. 1977).
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scrutiny with a firm foundation based upon factual determinations
of fundamental fairness and economic reasonableness which
should be our guideline for future cases."' 18
S: Your analysis indicates that what separates us is not a disagreement
about the nature of common-law precedent, but rather about the style in
terms of which the opinions embodying such precedents are crafted; al-
though I am now uncertain whether our disagreement represents any-
thing other than two ways of perceiving the same reality.
You noted, while we were discussing Salmon, that the clarity re-
quired by sound theory represents a need that the law must meet be-
cause theory is the only way in which we feel in control of the future. It
now seems to me that what you are arguing is that the entire legal com-
munity either does or should share your preference.
Nor are you alone in making that argument. Grant Gilmore's re-
cent lectures on The Death of Contract argued that what was striking
about "the formal system of the classical theorists"' 9 of contract
law-given that they based their theory on a limited selection of cases,
that many of those cases were English, and that even those cases were
often open to conflicting interpretations-was that it enjoyed such rapid
and widespread success. I now see that you are accounting for precisely
that phenomenon.
M: I am of course delighted to hear that you understand my argument, but
must point out that I think I can focus both on corporate rather than
contract law and on judicial style rather than the concept of precedent.
Thus, in the very lectures to which you refer, Gilmore draws the follow-
ing contrast:
On its own terms. . .the theory of contract, as formulated
by Holmes and Williston, seems to have gone into its pro-
tracted period of breakdown almost from the moment of its
birth. I have credited Holmes and Williston with the design
and execution of the great theory. It is tempting to set Car-
dozo and Corbin over against them as the engineers of its de-
struction. Tempting and by no means untrue. Cardozo's
attack was subtle, evasive, hesitant-it is by no means easy to
know how far that master of judicial ambiguity meant us to go
with the cryptic hints which he provided for our delectation
and bewilderment. But it is certain that the outlines of the
law of contract that emerged from the opinions of the New
York Court of Appeals during the period of Cardozo's domi-
nance of that court had little enough to do with the law of
contract as it was taught at Harvard during the same period.20
The extent to which that characterization of the author of Meinhard v.
Salmon is accurate seems to me to be demonstrated by an analysis of
18. 380 A.2d 969, 982 (Del. 1977).
19. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 103 (1974).
20. Id. at 57.
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his opinion in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co.,21 which
involved a suit by plaintiff corporation to compel specific performance
of contracts to supply electric current to its mills. The facts, as stated
in the opinion, are that "Greenidge. . .superintendent and later the
general manager of the defendant's electrical department, suggested to
Mr. Maynard [who was a director of both plaintiff and defendant cor-
porations] the substitution of electric power. . .Maynard was fearful
that the cost. . .would be too great unless the defendant would guaran-
tee a saving. . .[F]rom time to time the subject was taken up anew [and
after] investigation[s] by Greenidge. . .a contract was closed [in] the
form of letters exchanged between Greenidge and Maynard. '2 2 What
had happened was that "Greenidge had miscalculated the amount of
steam that would be required to heat the dye houses [because] changes
in the output of the mills had not been foreseen by Greenidge, and
Maynard had not warned of them."
2 3
The answer to the question why Maynard was held responsible for
having failed to warn Greenidge about possible future developments,
despite the facts that "plaintiff's books were thrown open to
Greenidge"24 and that "[Maynard] may have trusted to the superior
technical skill of Mr. Greenidge, 25 is phrased in terms of general rules:
"A beneficiary, about to plunge into a ruinous course of dealing, may
be betrayed by silence as well as by the spoken word. The trustee is
free to stand aloof, while others act, if all is equitable and fair. He
cannot rid himself of the duty to warn and to denounce, if there is
improvidence or oppression, either apparent on the surface, or lurking
beneath the surface, but visible to his practised eye,"'26 and "[A] finding
that there was [a relation of trust reposed, of influence exerted, of supe-
rior knowledge on the one side and legitimate dependence on the other]
has evidence to sustain it. A trustee may not cling to contracts thus
won, unless their terms are fair and just,"2 7 leading to the conclusion
that "The contracts before us do not survive these tests. The unfair-
ness is startling, and the consequences have been disastrous."
28
The difficulty with this precedent is the lack of clarity as to what
made the contract voidable: that Maynard was Greenidge's superior in
terms of the corporate hierarchy, that "As a result of [defendant's con-
tractual guarantee], it has supplied the plaintiff with electric current for
nothing, and owes, if the contract stands, about $11,000 for the privi-
lege,"2 9 or that Maynard was a director of both corporations. Theories
21. 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
22. Id. at 486, 121 N.E. at 378-79.
23. id. at 488, 121 N.E. at 379.
24. Id. at 486, 121 N.E. at 380.
25. Id. at 491, 121 N.E. at 380.
26. Id. at 489, 121 N.E. at 380.
27. Id. at 490, 121 N.E. at 380.
28. Id. at 491, 121 N.E. at 380.
29. Id.
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may often ignore differences regarded as significant by some in arriving
at the formal uniformity necessary to achieve an acceptable level of
consistency. One is more comfortable with the exercise of judicial
power, however, when one is certain as to the justification for the impo-
sition of liability.
S: I agree with you that Globe Woolen can be cited as authority for the
designation of Cardozo as a "master of judicial ambiguity." Indeed,
given Cardozo's concession that "It is not important. . .whether the
trustee foresaw the precise evils that developed, ' 30 what seems crucial to
justifying the voiding of the contract is the extent to which its one-sided
nature was not fairly to be regarded as Greenidge's responsibility; and
the answer to that inquiry must be based on an assessment of the extent
to which Maynard would have been justified in "trust[ing] to the supe-
rior technical skill of Mr. Greenidge" for more than "comput[ation]
with approximate accuracy [of] the comparative cost of steam and elec-
tricity.",3'
I agree that the general rules enunciated by Cardozo do not in any
way resolve this inquiry, and that, insofar as those rules constitute the
Globe Woolen precedent, its application in any given case is no less
mysterious than the rationale for its result. I note, however, that at-
tempts will always be made to evade any test enunciated in any opinion,
that the applicability of any precedent whose application would have
significant impacts on human behavior will be disputed, and that such
disputes will be resolved in terms of the facts determined upon in the
course of judicial proceedings. It is the uncertainty inherent in this
process that I find necessary and that you seem to be disputing.
M: How does that procedural uncertainty relate to our disagreement?
S: My argument is that it is precisely that uncertainty that constitutes the
law's recognition of the necessary limits of formal theory. Thus, given
the date of Globe Woolen, and the extent to which electricity repre-
sented a revolutionary technological innovation, the inquiry I have pos-
tulated as necessary seems to me to have been addressed in theoretical
terms by the two judges in the Appellate Division who found "that the
contracts were made in good faith and that the fact that Maynard was a
director in the defendant company did not influence them or have any-
thing to do with their making or affect their validity; that the contracts,
however, resulted solely from a mutual mistake of fact, and the defend-
ant should [therefore] be allowed to rescind .... -32
If you agree with this theoretical analysis, you surely remember
Raffles v. Wichelhaus,33 in which a ship Peerless carrying the goods in
question sailed from port at a time different from that at which another
30. Id. at 492, 121 N.E. at 381.
31. Id. at 491, 121 N.E. at 380.
32. 170 App. Div. 940, 941, 154 N.Y.S. 1123, 1124 (1915).
33. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
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ship Peerless sailed. Commenting on the Raffles decision, Holmes
noted that:
It is commonly said that such a contract is void, because
of mutual mistake as to the subject matter, and because there-
fore the parties did not consent to the same thing. But this
way of putting it seems to be misleading. The law has noth-
ing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds. .... 34
As a footnote to this passage, Holmes cites "CF. Kyle v. Kavanaugh,"
which involved a seller offering to convey land located on one of two
Prospect Streets in Waltham, Massachusetts, whereas the buyer in-
tended to buy land located on the other Prospect Street. Since the Kyle
contract involved the land itself, and the Raffles contract goods carried
on the ship. Peerless, it is clear, if one is concerned with objective fact
rather than "the actual state of the parties' minds," that Kyle is more
directly in point than Raffles as authority for Holmes' analysis.
M: I agree with your theoretical analysis, but how does Kyle's superiority
as legal authority demonstrate the necessary limits of theory?
S: Because insofar as law is itself a theoretical structure, and therefore
based on reasonably precisely defined concepts, what must be recog-
nized as important is the theoretically inescapable conclusion that the
"CF." citation is formally incorrect. As Gilmore puts it: "It is one of
the mysteries of the legal literature that every English-speaking lawyer
knows Raffles v. Wichelhaus while no one has even heard of Kyle v.
Kavanaugh."35
34. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 242 (Howe ed. 1863).
35. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 121 n.91 (1974).
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